Skip to main content

A Tale of Two Cases

When I was in law school, one of the cases I hated the most was Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966). I hated Schmerber for many reasons, but primarily because of its (in my opinion) conflated analysis of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and its unabashedly obvious, pro-law enforcement bias resulting in a flawed Fourth Amendment analysis. At that time, I thought the Court was wrong, and I still do.

It's been over 20 years since the US Supreme Court last gave more than a simple citation or two to Schmerber, and now, the Court gives us two decisions that implicate Schmerber in one term! And it's interesting (or at least I find it interesting) the differing ways the Court dealt with Schmerber in those two cases.

Much like the view of the arresting officer (and the dissenting aspects of the Chief Justice's opinion) in the first of these two cases, Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), my understanding of Schmerber from law school was that, in instances of suspected drunk driving where the suspect refuses a breath test, no warrant was needed to administer a blood test despite the suspect's refusal to consent. And despite lip service from the Schmerber Court about the importance of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, for me, Schmerber basically stood as a shining example of the not-so-subtle whittling away of our Fourth Amendment rights. I saw Schmerber as an opening for the government to take a truly Orwellian path that would lead to abuse against the populace by government officials and the dissipation of our privacy rights.

But then along comes McNeely, and my faith is (at least partially) restored! In McNeely, the Court held that my view of Schmerber was wrong. The Court in McNeely clarified that Schmerber did not categorically state that warrants were not required in such circumstances, but that, based on the totality of the circumstances, administering a blood test before obtaining a warrant may be permissible. In the grand scheme of things, that doesn't seem like all that much of a distinction, but I'll take it!

But then, just as I'm getting my hopes up, the Court comes back with Maryland v. King, No. 12-207, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 4165, 2013 WL 2371466 (June 3, 2013). In King, the Court found that DNA testing of arrestees (not convicted felons mind you, simply arrestees; so much for "innocent until proven guilty") did not violate the Fourth Amendment. After McNeely, one could very easily believe that the rule is "if you can, get a warrant". But then King comes along and yells, "Psych!" Whereas McNeely tempered Schmerber's "whatever-law enforcement-wants-is-reasonable" tone, King not only embraces Schmerber's deference to law enforcement, but even boosts it by implying that anything "routine" would pass constitutional muster. I still hate Schmerber, but King is downright bone-chilling.

Most interesting of all, again at least to me, is that Justice Kennedy was literally the swing vote. In McNeely, Kennedy sided with the three female justices and Justice Scalia to rein in Schmerber, but then he jumped ship and sided with the other four justices to place Schmerber on a pedestal in King. Now most pundits predict that Kennedy will be the deciding vote in the two same-sex marriage cases, but if he can be this contradictory with a text as clear as the Fourth Amendment, I almost fear the intellectual gymnastics he'll engage in to create two conflicting decisions regarding same-sex marriage.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

The Amazing, but True, Deportation Story of Carlos Marcello

Earlier this week, the University of Houston Law Center was fortunate to have as its guest Professor Daniel Kanstroom of Boston College of Law. An expert in immigration law, he is the Director of the International Human Rights Program, and he both founded and directs the Boston College Immigration and Asylum Clinic. Speaking as the guest of the Houston Journal of International Law’s annual Fall Lecture Series, Professor Kanstroom discussed issues raised in his new book, Aftermath: Deportation Law and the New American Diaspora . Professor Michael Olivas introduced Professor Kanstroom to the audience, and mentioned the fascinating tale of Carlos Marcello, which Professor Kanstroom wrote about in his chapter “The Long, Complex, and Futile Deportation Saga of Carlos Marcello,” in Immigration Stories , a collection of narratives about leading immigration law cases. My interest piqued, I read and was amazed by Kanstroom’s description of one of the most interesting figures in American le

C-SPAN Video Archive Now Online

Legislative researchers and politics fans take note. C-SPAN recently completed a digitization project placing the entirety of its video collection online. The archives record all three C-SPAN networks seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. The videos are available at no cost for historical, educational, research, and archival uses. The database includes over 160,000 hours of video recorded since 1987 and the programs are indexed by subject, speaker names, titles, affiliations, sponsors, committees, categories, formats, policy groups, keywords, and locations. The most recent, most watched, and most shared videos are highlighted on the main page. To start watching, visit the C-SPAN Video Library and use the search function at the top of the page.

Texas Subsequent History Table Ceases Publication

This week, Thomson Reuters notified subscribers that publication of the Texas Subsequent History Table will be discontinued and no further updates will be produced, due to “insufficient market interest.” Practitioners have been extracting writ (and since 1997, petition) history from the tables since their initial publication in 1917 as The Complete Texas Writs of Error Table . The tables, later published by West, have been used for nearly a century to determine how the Texas Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of an appeal from an intermediate appellate court. The purpose of adding this notation to citations is to indicate the effect of the Texas Supreme Court’s action on the weight of authority of the Court of Appeals’ opinion.  For example, practitioners may prefer to use as authority a case that the Texas Supreme Court has determined is correct both in result and legal principles applied (petition refused), rather than one that simply presents no error that requires